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1 Introduction
Negotiationisthesearchforagreementabouttheexchange(orallocation)ofscarceresources
among (self-)interested parties. Approaches to one-to-one1 automated negotiation have been
classiﬁed in three categories [20]: (1) game theoretic (2) heuristic and (3) argumentation-
based.
Theﬁrsttwofamiliesfocusonthetraditionalformofautomatedbilateralnegotiationchar-
acterized by the exchange of offers between parties with conﬂicting positions and interests,
as t y l ec o m m o n l yr e f e r r e dt oa sposition-based negotiation. These approaches tend to view
the object of the negotiation as ﬁxed and reduce the negotiation process to a search problem
in the space of possible deals. Bargaining consists in an exchange of offers by the agents,
who try to accommodate each other’s preferences until a deal is acceptable to both parties or
the negotiation terminates unsuccessfully.
Argumentation-basednegotiation(ABN)hasbeenintroducedtoenhanceautomatednego-
tiation with the exchange of richer information between negotiators, supporting or attacking
their positions and potentially modifying these positions. Interest-based negotiation (IBN) is
aparticulartypeofABNwheretheagentsexchangeinformationaboutthegoalsthatmotivate
their negotiation. The intuition behind ABN (emanating from the realm of human negotia-
tion) is that those exchanges can change the agents’ positions in a way that can increase the
likelihood or the quality of potential agreements.
While in the last decade, ABN and IBN have been the focus of many publications, as yet
veryfew(ifany)empiricalevaluationshavebeenprovided[44].2 IBNadvocatestheideathat
parties can increase the likelihood and quality of an agreement by exchanging information
about their underlying goals and about alternative ways to achieve them, and thus inﬂuence
the agents’ preferences over the object of the negotiation [38]. However, no evidence has
been provided to support this intuition. The present work advances the state of the art in
automated negotiation by testing this hypothesis empirically.
Tothisend,wedeﬁneanegotiationmodelsuitedtoagentswithhierarchicalgoals(Sect.3).
This model includes a bargaining protocol and monotonic concession strategy (Sect. 4.1), a
recursive reframing protocol and strategy (Sect. 4.2) and a meta-strategy to articulate those
two strategies in the agents’ behavior (Sect. 4.3). We exemplify this model and present the
simulation tool implemented (Sect. 5). Finally, we compare and discuss the results of (1)
negotiations between agents using only the bargaining strategy and (2) negotiations between
agentsthatusebothbargainingandreframing,inthreedifferenttypesofencounters(Sect.6).
Thenextsectionprovidesfurtherrationalefortheproposedapproachbyrelatingittoprevious
work on automated negotiation.
1 Many-to-many and many-to-one automated negotiations are usually handled using a growing variety of
auction-based models [54,52] and these negotiation types will not be considered in this work.
2 A notable exception is the work of Karunatillake et al. [23,22], but it aims at evaluating social rather than
interest-based arguments.
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2 Motivations, background and related work
2.1 Position-based negotiation: bilateral bargaining protocols
2.1.1 Game theoretic approaches
Bargaining has received considerable attention in economics, particularly using the ana-
lytical methods of game theory [36]. Initial studies dealt with settings where agents have
complete information3 about each other’s parameters [35], possibly taking into account the
effect of additional parameters, such as time preferences and deadlines, on the negotiation
outcome[48].Insuchcases,onecananalyticallycalculatethe(possiblyoptimal)equilibrium
outcome before the bargaining game is played.
Recognisingthattheassumptionofcompleteinformationisunrealisticinmanysituations,
economists explored bargaining models with incomplete information. Complete informa-
tion, in game theory, means: (1) common knowledge, which states that agents have common
knowledge about aspects of the game (e.g., each other’s private information) and (2) certain
knowledge, that is no uncertainty nor imprecision. These assumptions are often not satisﬁed
in computational settings that relate to realistic situations, which makes optimal game-the-
oretic strategies difﬁcult or impossible to prescribe and/or compute. There are at least two
ways of dealing with incomplete information in game theoretic approaches.
One approach taken by game theorists is to identify incomplete information with sto-
chastic information.4 It is then assumed that the world is stochastic (and stationary) and that
common information is available, at least in the form of common prior probability distribu-
tions [17,49]. Complete probability distributions over the possiblevalues for the information
needed are known to the agents. Players could be uncertain about various aspects of other
players, such as their discounting factors [49], reservation prices [12], or deadlines [53].
Thesecondapproachtodealwithincompleteinformationisrevelation.Wheninformation
(aboutthenegotiationobjectortheopponent’stype,goal,reservationpriceorpreferences,…)
is unknown to some agents, it is assumed that a revelation phase will precede the negoti-
ation phase. In this phase, the unknown information will be revealed. The negotiation will
then proceed as in the complete information case, under the assumption that the agents are
sincere. Sometimes, strategic manipulations can occur at this level [47].5 While it allows
keeping things analytically tractable in game theory through the use of the revelation princi-
ple—revealing all the preferences information—is associated with a number of drawbacks.
Firstly, the revelation of all the information can be computationally very expensive [6].
Indeed, the revelation phase consists of all agents revealing all the unshared information,
which may entail too many communications. This revelation phase clearly dissolves the
inherent beneﬁt and realism of distributed systems (such as multi-agent systems) in which
the information is (and has to stay) distributed [55].
3 Ingametheory,completeinformationimpliesthateveryplayerknowsthepayoffsandstrategiesavailableto
other players. The notion of complete information should not be confused with notion of perfect information
(state of complete knowledge of the actions of the other players associated with most sequential games).
4 The underlying idea is that, when the possible values of the information are known, ignorance can often be
reduced to equiprobability. However, it is important to notice that this procedure does not really acknowledge
the cases where some of the information is not available (e.g., the possible values are not all known).
5 Throughtheconcepts of mechanism design, in somespecial (restricted) cases, gametheoryallows to ensure
sincerity. This happens when (1) the agents are perfectly rational and (2) an incentive compatible mechanism
is provided.
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Secondly, one of the basics of the principled negotiation approaches [19,5]i st h a ti t
is important that the agents minimise the amount of information they reveal about their
preferences concerning the negotiation object, since any such revelation can weaken their
positions [40,46]. For example, negotiators are reticent to reveal their reservation price.
Furthermore, it has been shown that humans minimise the amount of private information
they reveal during a negotiation [18]. Any model of automated negotiation should follow the
same broad tenet if one wants the agents to be more believable, or simply if one wants to
model human negotiation. In particular, human-agent negotiation is a growing ﬁeld where
such considerations are important [16,14,29]. This minimality also serves the purpose of
reducing the complexity of communications induced by the revelation of preferences as used
in game theoretic approaches.
The idea underlying these two treatments of incompleteness in game-theoretical
approachesistoreduceincompletenessandreturntoacaseofcomplete(possiblystochastic)
information.
Underlying most game-theoretic frameworks are a number of other strong assumptions
whichareoftennotsatisﬁableincomputationalmodelsofbargaining.Forexample,itisoften
assumed that each player has unlimited computational resources and time. This implies that
each player is capable of computing optimal decisions (e.g., choose the best among alter-
native offers, compute an optimal strategy,…) and that such computations are performed
without cost. This is an unrealistic assumption both in human and software agent systems.
Indeed, most game-theoretic models provide no algorithms for implementing such players.6
2.1.2 Heuristic approaches
Fortheabovereasons,variousheuristic-basedframeworksforbilateralnegotiationhavebeen
developed and studied [25]. In these studies, authors typically devise heuristic strategies, or
rules-of-thumb, that may be used to produce good (but not necessarily optimal) decisions
during negotiation. These strategies are then tested experimentally in order to assess their
applicability and performance. A number of models of bilateral bargaining using heuristics
have been developed to date, such as:
– Approaches based on machine learning: For example, Matos and Sierra [33] proposed a
case-based and fuzzy logic based strategy. Zeng and Sycara [57] study bilateral bargain-
ing over a single issue (price), where an agent forms a hypothesis about its opponent’s
reservation prices (i.e., the highest price he is willing to pay if he is a buyer, or the lowest
price he is willing to receive if he is a seller) represented in terms of conditional proba-
bility statements (e.g., the probability of an agent’s reservation price being 130 is 17%).
An agent observes its opponent’s offers and uses Bayes’ rule to update the estimated
opponent reservation price in light of such observations.
– Constraint-based approaches: a number of heuristics based on constraint reasoning for
offer evaluation and generation have been proposed. A variety of techniques—constraint
satisfaction problem (CSP) [1,24], fuzzy constraint satisfaction problem (FCSP) [10],
prioritised constraint satisfaction problem (PFCSP) [32]—have been exploited for that
6 It is worth mentioning that game theorists have recently realised the significance of computational limi-
tations, resulting in the growth of so-called computational economics. This new ﬁeld is characterized by its
consideration of the work on bounded rationality [50]. For example, such models have investigated the impact
on the negotiation outcome of limited memory or lookahead in repeated games. In multiagent systems, some
work [27] did investigate a single-offer bargaining protocol where computational actions are treated as part of
the agent strategy.
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purpose. For example, in Faratin et al.’s model [10], a heuristic based on fuzzy simi-
larities selects, among the candidate offers, the one that is most similar to the last offer
made by the opponent. The main advantage of constraint-based approaches rests on the
expressivity of constraint. Indeed, while regular offers correspond to single points of the
search space, constraints usually describe and denote areas of the search space.
– Approachesbasedonqualitativedecisionmaking:anumberofapproacheshaveexploited
various qualitative decision making theories in order to develop models of negotiation
addressing cases that are not covered by game-theoretic approaches. These approaches
rangesfrompurelyqualitative,like thework ofGovernatorietal.[15]thatrestsondefea-
siblelogic,tohybridapproachesthatmixesqualitativemethodswithotherheuristics.For
example, Jonker et al. [21] developed agents capable of multi-attribute negotiation in the
context of incomplete preference information and incorporating “guessing” heuristic, by
which an agent uses the history of the opponents bids to predict his preferences. Simi-
larly, the work of Lin et al. [30] tackles the problem of multi-attribute negotiation with
bounded rational agents in cases of incomplete information. Validated against human
subjects, experiments showed that the resulting agent is performing better than human
subjects when playing their role.
All these heuristic strategies make use of the offer-based information which is exchanged
between agents (e.g., the opponent’s rate of concession) to infer useful information (e.g., the
opponent’s reservation price) which may lead to better agreements.
In summary, heuristic approaches to bilateral bargaining make use of computationally
tractable heuristics in order to circumvent the difﬁculties posed by the high computational
demands and the unlimited availability and quality of information required for optimal nego-
tiation behavior.
2.1.3 Summary of the criticisms of position-based approaches
While interesting conceptually, game theoretic approaches are restricted by strong assump-
tions which are the price paid for enabling formal results and guarantees to be established
analytically.Morespecifically,andputtingasideissuesofboundedrationality,gametheoretic
approaches to automated negotiation have been criticized for assuming:
1 Complete and common information: All the information about the negotiation objects
anddomainaswellastheothernegotiatorsisassumedtobeavailable(atleastintheform
of probability distributions) and common to all agents. However, “ordinary experience
seemstoindicatethatwhatmakeshorseracesisvariationamongprior”[31].Inparticular,
knowledgeoftheotheragent’sutilityfunctionisassumed,while“typically,thepartiesdo
not know each other’s utility functions with any degree of accuracy…Usually, they don’t
know each other’s BATNA [Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement]” [56,p .5 ] .
2 Perfect and correct information: All the information available (whether it is stochastic
or not) is assumed to be accurate. So far, no approach has considered the case in which
agents have incorrect7 information about the other agents or the negotiation object.
Under those assumptions, game theory can be used either to (1) compute optimal or equi-
librium strategies that the agents can use (under the assumption of perfect rationality) or (2)
design mechanisms that ensure good properties of the outcome. However, most real world
problemsarecasesofimperfect,erroneousandincomplete(i.e.,non-stochastic,notcommon)
7 Not to be confused with uncertain or imprecise.
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information where revelation is not realistic (either for computational or strategic reasons,
as discussed above).
While allowing progress on those restrictions of game theoretical approaches, heuris-
tic approaches suffer from two other main limitations that they share with game theoretic
ones [20]:
3 Agentcommunicationandcognitivecapabilitiesareunderused:Theonlyfeedbackgiven
tounacceptableproposalsiseitheracounter-proposalorarejection.Thelasttwodecades
of work on cognitive agent modelling and multi-agent systems have focused on develop-
ing techniques to model goal oriented cognitive agents and the way they inﬂuence each
other’s mental states through communication [55]. It therefore makes sense to exploit
these representations when attempting to reach agreement.
4 Thepositionsoftheagentsarestaticallydeﬁned:Thisisthebottomlineofposition-based
approaches to automated negotiation. Each agent has a clearly deﬁned position that is
static.Theoverlapbetweentheagents’positionscharacterisesaﬁxednegotiationset(i.e.,
set of possible deals, possibly empty). As noted by Jennings et al. [20], the negotiation
space does not change dynamically.
2.2 From position-based negotiation to interested-based negotiation
In this paper, we turn to the idea of argument-based negotiation (ABN) [25,26,37], which
can also be seen as a special case of heuristic approaches. However, instead of devising new
heuristics for making use of the offer-based information exchanged between agents, we fol-
lowtheintuitionthatagentsmayexchangeexplicitmeta-informationtoimprovethewaythey
negotiate. Argumentative messages relevant to the agents’ positions are exchanged that can
reveal any unknown, non-shared, incomplete, imprecise information about their underlying
mental attitudes [44]. Interest-based negotiation (IBN) is a particular type of ABN in which
the agents can exchange information about their underlying goals to guide the negotiation
process.
Originally developed for human negotiation and mediation practices and ﬁrst introduced
by Fisher and Ury [11], the theory of interest-based negotiation (IBN) assumes that parties
are much more likely to come to a mutually satisfactory outcome when the object of the
negotiation is not considered as central as the agents’ underlying interests. By focusing on
interests to be satisﬁed rather than positions to be won, IBN allows the agents to search the
space of negotiation objects (rather than the space of deals for a particular exchange). When
successful, this strategy gives each side more, thereby producing a “win–win” outcome.
While it is still under investigation in the literature on human negotiation [34], IBN has
been adapted to negotiation dialogues between artiﬁcial agents [41]. In that context, it is a
subclass of argumentation-based negotiation (where the agents may argue about other nego-
tiation related issues, i.e., beliefs, goals or social aspects). Interest-based negotiation is based
ontheideathattheagentscanmakethegoalsunderlyingthenegotiationexplicitanddisclose
information about alternative ways to achieve these.
While classical position-based approaches (heuristic approaches or game theoretic
approaches) focus on processes to accommodate the agents’ preferences with respect to
a particular static position, in IBN, the agents’ positions may change. We now consider some
informal examples to illustrate this idea.
First, consider the following bargaining dialogue where the agents’ preferences are sum-
marized by Fig. 1, part (i). In this example, the agents fail to reach a deal because it is not
possible to accommodate their respective preferences.
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i
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150 250 400 300
350 200 250 300
prefmin prefmax prefmin prefmax
reservation 
price
reservation 
price
iii
300 200 250
car
car
plane 150
Fig. 1 Upper and lower bounds on agents’ preferences
B1: I would like to rent a car for 4 days please.
S1: I offer you one for $400.
B2: No! How about $150?
S2: I can let it go for $300, but that is my last offer.
B3: Sorry, I can’t afford that amount!
Of course, sometimes, agents’ preferences overlap (as in Fig. 1, part (ii)) and a deal can
be reached using a monotonic-concession bargaining strategy as in the following dialogue:
B1: I would like to rent a car for 4 days please.
S1: I offer you one for $350.
B2: No! How about $200?
S3: Impossible! How about $275 then?
B3: That is OK, I accept!
However, it is worth noticing that agents had to make concessions and move away from
their preferred outcome in order to reach a deal. The following dialogue gives an example
of IBN dialogue where the seller agent (S) asks the buyer to disclose his underlying interest
(goal) before making a concession. In this example, the seller knows an alternative way to
fulﬁll the buyer’s underlying goal that he considers to be cheaper.
B1: I would like to rent a car for 4 days please.
S1: I offer you one for $400.
B2: No! How about $200?
S2: I can’t do that! What do you need a car for?
B3: I want to drive to Sydney to attend a conference.
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S3: You can also ﬂy to Sydney! Booking a plane ticket with Quantum airlines will
actually be cheaper!
B4: I didn’t know ﬂights were so cheap! Can I get one for $250?
S4: Yes, that is possible.
This particular negotiation strategy is known in the human negotiation literature as refra-
ming. This reframing allowed the buyer to update the way he was (incorrectly) evaluating
the cost of some missing resources. This reframing process allows the agents to move from
the situation depicted in Fig. 1, part (i) to the more favorable one described by part (iii) of
Fig.1. Notonly was adeal reached(qualitative advantage),butassuming that theseller earns
a $100 proﬁt on both the rental of a car for $400 and a $250 Quantum ticket, an agreement
is reached without any concession and a beneﬁt is made (quantitative advantage).
The model developed in this paper covers this very common buyer-seller example as well
as more complex ones in which agents exchange sets of resources (including compensatory
payments) in a context where they both have hierarchical goal structures (with several levels
of increasingly abstract underlying goals). In other words, we aim to generalize and charac-
terize under which conditions the phenomenon observed in this realistic scenario occurs.
2.3 Summary of contributions
On the one hand, our work distinguishes itself from game-theoretic approaches in the same
way as heuristic approaches do—that is, by providing a more realistic computational model
of negotiating agents. In our case, agents do not have any knowledge about the partner’s
utility function (not even a probability distribution), do not know each other’s goals and have
erroneous estimations of the value of the resources not owned.
On the other hand, our approach distinguishes itself from heuristic approaches by pro-
posing a model of recursive reframing. More precisely, reframing is a particular type of
interest-based negotiation (IBN) strategy that allows agents to ask about the goal(s) underly-
ing the requested item(s) and allows them to give constructive feedback. In our case, agents
willproposealternativeplan(s)thatarethoughttobecheaperwhichwillallowthecorrection
of misestimated costs for some of the resources being negotiated. This elaborated feedback
can change the agents’ preferences and thus the issues or objects under negotiation. This
strategy may thus allow the agents to reach a deal in this new negotiation space. This IBN
strategycanbeconsideredasatypeofargumentation-based(ABN)strategyrestingondelib-
erative arguments, where the support consists of goals and beliefs and the conclusion is the
goal/intention to get the negotiated item(s).
This paper contributes to the state of the art in automated negotiation in two important
ways. Firstly, it provides a formal, computational and reproducible model of IBN agents that
partiallyovercomesthefourlimitationsofposition-basednegotiationindicatedinSect.2.1.3.
In particular, this model considers the case in which the agents may have erroneous estima-
tions of the value of the resources they need. In the previous example, the buyer agent had an
erroneous evaluation of how much a plane ticket costs. As these errors are very common in a
varietyofrealisticsituations,ouraimistomovetowardsmodelsthatarerobusttothesetypes
oferroneousevaluationsbytheagents.Theerrormadebytheagentcanbeanoverestimation
or an underestimation of any of the resources pursued. Our model deﬁnes both a bargaining
and a reframing protocol.
Secondly, this paper presents the ﬁrst extensive empirical analysis of interest-based nego-
tiation. The implementation of our model and a simulator will be presented. We present
a number of simulation results providing evidence of the advantage of IBN over strictly
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position-based negotiation. These results are presented along two dimensions: qualitative
(i.e., whether agents reach some deals when bargaining alone is failing) and quantitative
(i.e., the gains made in terms of cost of the plan and beneﬁt made by the agents). Fur-
thermore, we show (experimentally) that in buyer-seller scenarios, using bargaining with
reframing Pareto-dominates using bargaining alone, and we discuss reasons why this result
does not hold in more complex settings.
Note that the use of simulation was an important methodological choice which resulted
fromthefactthatundertheprecisesetofassumptionsmadeinourmodel,wedidnotsucceed
in developing an analytical proof (for example a game-theoretic analysis) that would give us
insights into the consequences or properties of the model.
In summary, this paper presents the ﬁrst extensive empirical analysis of an interest-based
negotiation framework. In our model, agents communicate information about each other’s
goals and alternative ways to achieve them (estimated to be cheaper by one of the party)
and use this information to improve the negotiation process. Such a reframing strategy takes
advantage of the communication and cognitive capabilities of goal-driven artiﬁcial agents
whicharemostlyignoredbytraditional formal andempirical approachestoautomatednego-
tiation usually grounded in applied mathematics or micro-economics.
3 Agents with hierarchical goals
This section and the next one present the proposed computational model in a very precise
way so as to ensure full reproducibility of the results.
3.1 Preliminary definitions
Our model considers agents that need resources to achieve their hierarchical goal(s). The
notion of resource used in the model is kept very general, encompassing physical (e.g., ink
to print a page,…) as well as abstract (e.g., an agent i doing an action α at time t)e l e m e n t s
of the environment.
Deﬁnition 1 (IBN domain) An IBN domain consists of the following:
– A ={A1,...,An} is the set of agents, limited to two in the context of bilateral negotia-
tion;
– G ={ G1,...,Gm} is the set of all possible goals;
– goali ∈ G is the root goal of agent i;8
– Res ={ r1,...,rp} is the set of resources;
– resi ⊆ Res is the set of indivisible resources owned by agent i;
– sub ⊆ G ×2G∪Res is the relationship between goals and their decomposition in sub-goals
and resources needed to achieve them;9
– vali : Res → Risafunctionthatreturns,foreachagent,itsvaluationofitsownresources,
as well as the estimated value of resources not owned by itself.
– Budgeti ∈ R+ is a positive number which stands for the amount of money owned by
agent i.
8 Throughout the paper, we assume that each agent has a single goal. Multiple goals can be expressed by a
single root-level goal that has a single possible decomposition.
9 Note that this is a relation (not a function), which allows expressing that a goal may be fulﬁlled by multiple
sets of alternative sub-goals or resources.
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In that model, money is treated as a ﬁnite quantity and will be expressed using positive
real numbers. The valuation of resources is expressed using money as a unit. In this context,
agents maintain preference intervals over the selling values of the resources they own and
over the acquisition costs of the resources they do not possess.
In our model, agents preferences for a given resource are represented using a preference
interval as exempliﬁed in the example and real world scenario presented in Sect. 2.2.F o r
each resource x in the domain, each agent maintains a least preferred value prefmin(x)
and a most preferred value prefmax(x) for which to exchange the resource. For a resource
owned, pref min(x) denotes the least amount the agent is willing to accept in terms of
money, and prefmax the maximum it expects to sell the resource for. For a resource not
owned, prefmin corresponds to the maximum amount of money an agent is willing to give
to acquire the resource while prefmax is then the least amount of money he expects to have
to pay for the acquisition. Note that prefmin returns what is called in economics [2]t h e
seller’s reservation price for the resource owned (that is the minimum price the agent is will-
ing to accept as a seller of this resource) and the buyer’s reservation price for the resources
not owned (that is the maximum price the buyer is willing to pay for the resource). While in
theory, prefmax would be unbounded, in a real world scenario it is not, as no agent would
propose to sell a resource owned for an inﬁnite amount of money. Conversely, agents will
not propose to acquire a resource for free. In the case of both the buyer and seller, prefmax
represents what is sometimes called, in economics and ﬁnance, the ﬁrst offer price.
Deﬁnition 2 (Preferences)
– prefmini : Res → R is a function that returns the least preferred value for selling or
acquiring a particular resource for agent i.
– prefmaxi : Res → R is a function that returns the most preferred value for selling or
acquiring a particular resource for agent i.
– Agents being rational, it follows that:
– ∀i ∈ A,∀x ∈ resi,prefmaxi(x) ≥ prefmini(x)
– ∀i ∈ A,∀x / ∈ resi,prefmaxi(x) ≤ prefmini(x)
Part (i) of Fig. 1 exempliﬁes prefmin and prefmax and preference intervals in the case
of the travel agent scenario presented in Sect. 2.2.
Note that the evaluation of the value of the resources not owned can be (and usually is)
different from the reservation price of the owner. In the example of Fig. 1, the rental of the
car, a resource noted r, can have a value 200 for the seller S (valS(r) = 200), and can be
estimated to 200 by B (valB(r) = 200). Still it is possible that S does not want to sell it for
less than 300 (prefminS(r) = 300, the least amount of money that S is willing to accept
for the resource: that is S’s reservation price). It is also possible that B is willing to give
up to 250 for acquiring r (prefminB(r) = 250, the least preferred amount of money B is
willing to give to S to acquire r). Note that in that case prefminS(r) − prefminB(r)<0,
indicating that the bargaining interval is empty.
While our model is general and can be used to represent all sorts of scenarios, we further
constrain it, for the sake of the empirical studies presented in this paper. We reﬁne the model
with the following assumptions that allow us to calculate the preference interval boundaries
prefmin(x) and prefmax(x) in a systematic way. First, we make the assumption that the
reservation price for a resource (pref min) corresponds to its subjective valuation.
Assumption 1 (Exchange preferences) We assume that the least preferred value for selling
a resource owned or for the acquisition of a resource not owned (i.e., the reservation price)
is its estimated value. Formally:
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∀i ∈ A,∀x ∈ Res,prefmini(x) = vali(x)
Other choices are possible and are observed in real life scenarios: for example, when a
ﬁxed margin is enforced by the seller agent, prefmini(x)>vali(x), as is the case in the car
rental example of Sect. 2.2 or most products on sales in stores. In other cases, an agent is
ready to give up a resource for less than its value, in which case prefmini(x)<vali(x).T h e
simpliﬁcation introduced by Assumption 1 means that: (1) agents may be willing to give up
proﬁt10 on the resources they own but are not ready to do or give anything for less than its
subjectivevalue;andsymmetrically,(2)agentswillnotgivemorethantheircurrentvaluation
fortheresourcestheydonotown.Inotherwords,agentsarereadytoconcedetheirgainupto
their reservation price and this equals their subjective evaluation. Note that this assumption
does not have any effect on the main results of this paper.
For the ﬁrst offer price (pref max), we assume a ﬁxed margin of potential beneﬁt for
each agent expressed as a percentage of its reservation price (prefmin). This assumption is
introduced to facilitate the presentation of the results and means that for a given agent the
absolute ratio between prefmini(x) and prefmaxi(x) will be identical for all resources.
Assumption 2 (Potential beneﬁt) The so-called potential beneﬁt of agent i is speciﬁed as a
percentage b such that:
– ∀x ∈ resi,prefmaxi(x) = prefmini(x) + b ∗ prefmini(x)
– ∀x / ∈ resi,prefmaxi(x) = prefmini(x) − b ∗ prefmini(x)
Forexample,ifthevaluationofaparticularresourceis100andthepercentageis10%then
the agent will try to sell the resource for 110 (or try to buy it for 90 if she is a buyer). Note
that we model b as a percentage mainly for the ease of computing the preference intervals.
Other choices could be made without consequences for the main results of the paper.
Another set of assumptions constrains the structure of the previously described IBN
domains.
Assumption 3 (Distribution of the resources) For distribution of the resources, we assume
that:
–
 
i∈A resi =∅(the resources are not shared);
–
 
i∈A resi = Res (all the resources are owned);
Assumption 4 (Type of resources) We assume that resources are consumable.
This will inﬂuence the calculations in the sense that—a priori—the estimated cost of
using a resource is represented by its subjective value (as given by the function val). Note
that—a posteriori—the cost of using a resource is given by its value if it is owned (which can
derive from its acquisition cost, but not necessarily) and by its acquisition cost if it has been
acquired. For example, in the car rental example of Sect. 2.2,F i g .1 ii, agent B evaluates
the use of a rented car for four days to $300 (valB(4daysCarRental) = 300). Using that
resource as part of a plan will thus cost B $300 (i.e., B’s assets will diminish by $300). This
is if B already paid $300 for the car rental. If B does not own that resource yet and merely
plans to acquire it, this is just an estimated value and she may end up getting a deal for $275
(as in the example of Figure 1 ii) and will then have to update her valuation consequently. In
any case, considering reusable resources would complexify that calculus and is left as future
work.
10 Proﬁt is the difference between the actual value for which a resource is exchanged and the subjective
evaluation of that resource prior to the negotiation.
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Assumption 5 (Shared vs. private knowledge) We assume that the agents have a shared,
common, and accurate knowledge of the set of all possible goals, the set of all possible
resources, and all possible decompositions of goals, i.e., they know G, Res, resi and sub.
In other words, they all have the “know-how” of the domain and have a common ontology
thereof. However, they do not know each other’s goals, valuation function or preferences.
I.e, goali, vali, pref mini and prefmaxi are strictly private information.
While the presented model is more general, in the remainder of this paper, we restrict the
negotiation to two agents. Exploring the model beyond bilateral negotiation settings is left
to future work.
Algorithm 1 Generate plans for goal G
Global variables:
plan[] : Vector of plans, i.e. trees
z := 0 : Number of plans in plan[]
cost[] : Vector of costs for the corresponding plans
generatelist[] : Vector of lists of nodes to generate
Global code:
z := 1; plan[1]: =G : Initialize plan[1] with G
generate(G, plan[1]) : Generate all the plans for goal G
i := min(cost[]) : Index of the cheapest plan
result := plan[i] : Return the cheapest plan
Procedure generate(node,plan[x])
Local variables:
i := 1 : Number of the current decomposition for the current node
next,child : Variables of type node, i.e. a goal or a resource
children : Set of nodes
curplan := plan[x] : Current plan
curind := x : Index of the current plan
curgeneratelist := generatelist[x]
Body:
for all (node,children) ∈ sub do
if i > 1 then
plan[z + 1]: =curplan
z := z + 1
curind := z
end if
i := i + 1
for all child ∈ children do
addchild(child,node,plan[curind])
if child ∈ Res then
cost[curind]: =cost[curind]+val(child)
else
add(child,generatelist[curind])
end if
end for
while generatelist[curind]  = ∅do
next := pop(generatelist[curind])
generate(next, plan[curind])
end while
end for
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3.2 Generating hierarchical plans
Under the assumptions sketched above, agents can use Algorithm 1 given below to generate
all the possible plans (along with their costs) to achieve a particular goal.
Deﬁnition 3 (Plan, cost and beneﬁt)T h enth plan Pn
i generated by agent i for achieving a
goal G0 is a tree such that:
– G0 is the root;
– Each non-leaf node is a goal G ∈ G with children x1,...xm such that:
sub(G,{x1,...xm});
– Each leaf node x is a resource: x ∈ Res
We denote needed(Pn
i ) the set of leaf nodes of the plan Pn
i and missingi(Pn
j ) the subset
ofneeded(Pn
j )notownedbyagenti (missingi(Pn
j ) = needed(Pn
j )\resi).Moregenerally,
we denote by missingi the set of resources that an agent i is willing to acquire.
The estimated cost of a plan Pn
j for agent i is:11
costi(Pn
j ) =
 
x∈needed(Pn
j )
vali(x)
The potential beneﬁt that an agent i can make on a plan Pn
j —in selling the resources he
owns that are needed by agent j for executing the plan—is deﬁned by:
benefi(Pn
j ) =
 
x∈needed(Pn
j )∩resi
prefmaxi(x) − prefmini(x)
We note  c
i and  b
i the preference ordering of the plans according to these estimated costs
and beneﬁts.
The use of the hierarchical structure of goals, super-goals and subgoals gives a great
expressivity to the model [45]. Since we do not over-specify this choice, related repre-
sentations using the same type of structures (like tasks, sub-tasks and super-tasks, as in
TAEMS [28]) can still be captured.
Assumption 6 (Independenceofgoalsandplans)Weassumethatnooverlapexistsbetween
agents’ needed resources, nor between their plans’ root or sub-goals:
– ∀n,m,needed(Pn
i )
 
needed(Pm
j ) = ∅
– ∀n,m,∀x ∈ G ∪ Res : x ∈ Pn
i ⇒ x / ∈ Pm
j
This last assumption is realistic in many domains where agents operate in separate but
complementary sub-domains. For example, agents that are associated with different roles in
an organization often have mutually exclusive sets of goals. Other examples include most
of the buyer-seller cases (that constitutes the bulk of economic exchanges). This assumption
means that there will not be positive or negative interactions between goals, nor conﬂicts
over resources. These issues are dealt with in related work [47], including ours [43], and we
plan to address them further in future work (described in Sect. 8).
Despite these assumptions, it is important to notice that this model is still very gen-
eral, encompassing multiple instances. It moves beyond usual position-based approaches by
11 Note that we use “cost” for plans and “valuation” for resources. Indeed, we assume that the resources will
be consumed by the plan execution as speciﬁed by Assumption 4. Note also that i and j can differ as an agent
can estimate the cost of another agent’s plan.
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addressing the case in which agents build their own (i.e., subjective and possibly errone-
ous) evaluations of resources according to their own calculus. While the acquisition of these
evaluations is not modelled in the present paper, these can be based on the agents’ beliefs
(possibly uncertain, imprecise or erroneous), biased by their interests as well as their past
experience, including information that has been communicated to them by other agents and
so on.
It is usually the case that these subjective evaluations are erroneous and agents cannot
(easily) assess how far they are from the real value since: if an agent asks the opponent about
the true value, the latter will (rationally) give her preferred value. Position-based negotiation
(called bargaining throughout this paper) is the process by which the agent will try to move
thepartner’spositionfromherpreferredvaluetowardherreservationvalue(reservationprice
in the rest of this paper) which can itself be different from the subjective value given by the
owner of the resources.
These assumptions are thus realistic modelling choices, that correspond to real world sit-
uations such as price negotiation on a vegetable market. The buyer typically estimates the
value of the resources he needs prior to the bargaining. Anyone who has travelled will know
how erroneous such estimations can be. Not only are these cases interesting to model, but
they are also relevant to automated negotiation for the reasons mentioned above. A recent
synthesis on automated negotiation [3] indicates the need for models that deal with uncer-
tainty or imprecision about the negotiation object rather than uncertainty about the partner
utility function (or type) as is usually the case.
4 The negotiation framework
In order to enable agents to use both bargaining and reframing, one needs to deﬁne appro-
priate communication protocols and negotiation strategies. Figure 2 presents the UML 2.0
speciﬁcation of the two sub-protocols: (a) the bargaining protocol and (b) the reframing one.
The following subsections describe these protocols as well as the associated strategies. A
detailed example of negotiation using this framework is presented in Sect. 5.2.
4.1 Bargaining: protocol and strategy
Part (a) of Fig. 2 describes the proposed bargaining protocol. In order to ensure that at least
the initiator agent needs a negotiation dialogue to occur, we assume that missingi  = ∅.T h e
bargaining protocol initiated by agent i with agent j is divided into two parts as follows:
– Part one: negotiating the resources to be exchanged
Each agent discloses the set of resources that he wants:12
informi(need(missingi)),informj(need(missingj))
– Part two: bargaining over the payment
– i makes a ﬁrst offer (Definition 7)
–T h e n j chooses between the three following options:
– accepti’sproposal:thisoptionischosenbyanagentiftheconditionfortheaccep-
tance of a proposal (Definition 6) is met, in which case bargaining terminates with
a deal;
12 Assumption 6 simpliﬁes this part of the protocol. Relaxing it to treat negative and positive interactions
between goals and needs is left as future work.
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Fig. 2 UML 2.0 speciﬁcation of
the bargaining and reframing
protocols
Initiator i Partner j
Inform(need(missingi))
Propose(proposali)
Reject()
Accept()
Propose(proposalj)
Reject()
Accept()
Initiator i Partner j
Request(why(missingj))
Inform(because(X))
Reject(reframing(missingj))
Inform(cheaper(Y))
Reject(reframing(missingj))
(a) Bargaining
(b) Reframing
Reframing on X
Inform(need(missingj))
– reject i’s proposal: this option is chosen if the ending condition (Definition 9)i s
met, in which case bargaining terminates without a deal;
– make a counter proposal: a counter proposal is generated according to the bar-
gaining strategy (Definition 8 or 7 if it is j’s ﬁrst proposal), in which case the
negotiation partner has to respond similarly, with acceptance, rejection or counter
proposal.
Notethatinparttwooftheprotocol,thesetofresourcesnegotiatedcannotbechangedany-
more (missingi and missingj are ﬁxed); that is the bargained items are ﬁxed (in conformance
with classic definitions of bargaining in economics).
Deﬁnition 4 (Proposal) A proposal (or offer) from i to j is a tuple:
 Swanted, Sgiven, Payment i→j,w h e r eSwanted is a set of resources wanted by i from j,
Sgiven is a set of resources given to j and Payment is an amount of money offered by
i to j (if positive) or asked (if negative) to compensate any difference in value (which is
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subjectively evaluated by i). We note pt
i,t h et-th proposal issued by agent i and abbreviate
it to pi when it does not matter.
Deﬁnition 5 (Proposal evaluation) Given a proposal pi= Swanted, Sgiven, Payment i→j,
its subjective evaluation by agents i and j respectively is deﬁned as follow:
evali(pi) =
 
x∈Swanted
vali(x) −
 
x∈Sgiven
vali(x) − Payment
evalj(pi) = Payment +
 
x∈Sgiven
valj(x) −
 
x∈Swanted
valj(x)
Deﬁnition 6 (Acceptance of a proposal) An agent j will accept a proposal pi =
 Swanted, Sgiven, Payment i→j iff:
– evalj(pj) − evalj(pi) ≤ ρ,w h e r epj is the next proposal to be issued by j and ρ is a
strictly positive real number standing for the deviation tolerated by j.13
– Payment ≤ Budgetj
We assume that agreements are enforceable.
Deﬁnition 7 (Bargaininginitialproposals)Foranagent j,theﬁrstofferwilltaketheclassic
form:
p1
j =  missingj,missingi, Payment j→i
where Payment is deﬁned as:
Payment = min
⎛
⎝
 
ri∈missingj
prefmax j(ri) −
 
rj∈missingi
prefmax j(rj), Budgetj
⎞
⎠
In this paper, we will use a simple monotonic concession strategy.
Deﬁnition 8 (Concession strategy) Given a proposal pi =  Swanted, Sgiven,
Payment i→j received by j as a response to his previous proposal pt
j, the next proposal to
be issued by j would take the form:
pt+1
j =  S 
wanted, S 
given, Payment  j→i
where:
– S 
wanted = Sgiven;
– S 
given = Swanted;
– Payment  is such that:
evalj(pt+1
j ) =
(evalj(pt
j) + evalj(pi))
2
If evalj(pt+1
j ) ≥ 0a n dBudgetj ≥ Payment  then:
pt+1
j =  S 
wanted, S 
given, Payment  j→i or else pt+1
j = pt
j.
13 ρ isusuallyquitesmallandisherejusttoavoidinﬁnitelengthbargaining.Itcanbeexpressedasapercentage
of evalj(pj), typically between 0.1 and 5% depending on the domain.
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The last part of this definition implies that when an agent reaches a point where he cannot
make any more concessions (whether because he reached his least preferred acceptable pro-
posalorbecausehedoesnothaveenoughmoney),hewillrepeathislastproposal.Whenboth
agents are in that situation, the bargaining ends without a deal as speciﬁed by the following
ending condition.
Deﬁnition 9 (Bargaining ending condition) The bargaining ending condition is reached iff
i’s two last proposal pt
i and pt+1
i are such that pt
i = pt+1
i and j’s last and forthcoming
proposal pt
j and pt+1
j such that pt
j = pt+1
j .
In that case, j will issue a reject message rather than the proposal pt+1
j .
4.2 Reframing: protocol and strategy
Part (b) of Fig. 2, describes the (recursive) reframing protocol. Initiated by agent i,t h i sp r o -
tocol allows agent i to ask agent j what is(are) his underlying goal(s) justifying his need for
missingj. Agent j can then (1) disclose his set of underlying goals gj ={ x1,...,xn} moti-
vating the need to acquire missingj while clarifying the sub-plan(s) selected for achieving
it14 or (2) reject the question, thus ending the reframing protocol (e.g., there is no underlying
goal to disclose, the last goal disclosed was the root goal).
Agent i then generates all the possible plans for achieving the goals of gj and can either:
1. Inform j of one alternative plan to achieve one of j’s underlying goals that i believes
(according to  c
i built upon i’s private valuation function vali) to be preferable (that is
cheaper) than the one previously selected by j.
2. Reject the reframing (e.g., because he does not have any alternative offer to propose for
any of the goals pursued by j, nor for any of their potential super-goals).
3. Start a new reframing protocol to inquire about the super-goals of gj.
In the ﬁrst case, when several alternative ways to achieve one of the goals of gj exist,
revelations are made by agent i in a rational way according to  b
i : that is, the one with the
highest potential beneﬁt for i is disclosed ﬁrst.15
On receiving the information that there is an alternative plan (P2
j ) for achieving a goal
from gj which is evaluated by i to be cheaper than the one selected by j (P1
j ), agent j will
update his valuation function over the resources not owned according to this new informa-
tion. We assume that the valuation of the resources owned is ﬁxed and it will not be updated.
In general, there are many ways in which this update can be made. When possible, j can
(1) raise P1
j ’s cost, (2) lower P2
j ’s cost or (3) both (and to various degrees). In the current
implementation, we use an update strategy of the type (3).
Deﬁnition 10 (Update function)L e tmissingj(P1
j ) and missingj(P2
j ) be the sets of
resourcesnotownedby j involvedin P1
j (j’scurrentplan)and P2
j (alternativeplanproposed
by i) respectively:
– The values of the resources that are shared by the two plans (i.e. included in:
missingj(P1
j )
 
missingj(P2
j )) are not changed.
14 Only the goals of one level up are revealed.
15 In case of equal potential beneﬁt, a random choice is made.
123Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst
– The values of the resources that are not shared by the two plans, i.e. included in:
missingj(P1
j )\(missingj(P1
j )
 
missingj(P2
j )) or in
missingj(P2
j )\(missingj(P1
j )
 
missingj(P2
j )) are equally raised and lowered respec-
tively so that the cost of the sub-plans are such that costj(P2
j ) = costj(P1
j ) − ρ (i.e P2
j
is cheaper than P1
j ).16
Other choices corresponding to strategies of type (1) or (2) are worth studying but are
left as future work. In any case, these update strategies assume that agent j trusts i since the
update makes i’s statement true in j’s model.17
4.3 Agent behavioural model
In this paper, we are mainly interested in comparing the results of negotiations between
agents capable of bargaining only (noted BO) versus between agents capable of bargaining
and reframing (noted BR). The following sub-sections describe the execution cycle of these
two types of agents.
4.3.1 Bargaining only agents
A BO agent’s execution cycle can be summarised as follows:
1. The agent generates all the possible plans to achieve her goal and orders them according
to their costs;
2. She selects the cheapest plan to achieve her goal;
3. If the plan involves resources not owned, then she starts a bargaining as described in
Sect. 4.1;
4. Ifthebargainingfails,shewithdrawsthecurrentplanandproceedswiththenextcheapest
plan through step 3.
The process terminates when there is no plan left or when a deal is reached.18
4.3.2 Reframing capable agents
Bargainingandreframing(BR)capableagents’executioncycleextendstheoneofBOagents
with the reframing capabilities described in Sect. 4.2.
Since BR agents have two different negotiation strategies available to them—namely bar-
gaining and reframing—there are a variety of meta-strategies available to compose them. In
particular, if we note by B a complete bargaining, B1 the ﬁrst part of the bargaining protocol
(i.e. only the revelation of needed resources), RA a reframing initiated by A and U the fact
that the agents’ valuation functions are updated (or not) according to the last reframing, the
following meta-strategies give different outcomes:
16 In the absence of more information, it is assumed that the alternative plan is just a little bit cheaper (where
“a little bit” is represented by ρ).
17 This assumption is to be relaxed. However, the assumption rests on the intuition that it is to the advantage
of both agents to be sincere and trust each other’s statements.
18 Since each agent has a ﬁnite number of plans and the monotonic concession protocol is known to termi-
nate [9], negotiations between BO agents always terminate.
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1. B1 → RB → U → B → RA → B...
2. B1 → RA → U → B → RB → B...
3. B → RA → U → B → RB → U → B...
4. B → RB → U → B → RA → U → B...
5. B → RA → U → RB → U → B...
6. B → RA&B → U → B...
The two ﬁrst strategies start with the reframing protocol (as soon as the resources to be
exchanged are known). This can lead to revelations that can modify the agents’ preferences
before the ﬁrst bargaining occurs. In addition to all the undesirable properties of using the
revelation principle (even partial) described in Sect. 2.1.1, this can have negative side effects
on the negotiation outcome. This can be exempliﬁed by looking at a modiﬁed version of the
informal example given in Sect. 2.2. We assume that: (a) cars are cheaper than plane tickets
and (b) for a given price, the seller is making more beneﬁt from a plane ticket than from
a car. This meta-strategy could then penalise the buyer. Indeed, an early revelation of the
buyer’s underlying goal would result in the seller wanting to hide the fact that there are some
cars available, or artiﬁcially augmenting his reservation price for car rental in the ﬁrst place
to see if he can sell a plane ticket. In general, agents have an incentive not to reveal their
underlying goals before they have evidence that their initial preferences cannot be satisﬁed
(i.e., the initial bargaining fails).
In this paper, BR agents will use the meta-strategy number 6. Agents start with a (com-
plete) bargaining (protocol). If the bargaining fails, both agents attempt19 reframing before
initiating a new bargaining. All reframings have to terminate before the agents (possibly)
update their valuation functions and a new bargaining is initiated. The rationale for this
choice is that such “parallel” reframing does not give any undue advantage to one agent.
Note that all other cases create different asymmetries between the agents that can modify
substantiallytheresultsobtained.Studyingtheseothermeta-strategiesisleftforfuturework.
To further avoid any asymmetry between the agents (in the BR as in the BO case), the
agent that initiates the negotiation in our simulations is chosen randomly.
5 Implementation and example
5.1 Implementation and parameters of experimentation
In order to assess the model’s behavior, we have developed a negotiation simulator based
on the 3APL agent programming language and environment [7,8]. This simulator allows the
generation of synthetic IBN domains, as well as BO and BR agents as well as conducting
and visualizing various negotiation simulations. A variety of parameters can be manipulated
as described below.
5.1.1 Parameters about the domain
Itisclearthatthestructureofthedomaincaninﬂuencetheresultsobtainedintheexperiments
envisionedtocompareBO andBR negotiations.Inparticular, the complexityandrichnessof
the goal decomposition relation (sub) will have an impact on the usefulness of using refra-
ming. For example, reframing is completely useless when no alternative decompositions are
available whatsoever. In those cases, no alternative ways to achieve the underlying goal(s)
can be proposed or discussed.
19 Following a buyer-seller bargaining only one agent can attempt a reframing.
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Oursimulationtoolincludesasyntheticdomaingenerationmodulewhichallowsdeﬁning
the depth of the trees (i.e., plans) generated as well as their branching factors. Finally, the
number of alternative ways to achieve each goal can be manipulated as well. As an example,
with depth 2, branching factor 2 and a number of alternatives of 2, we get 8 possible plans
to achieve the agent’s main goal.
5.1.2 Parameters related to the agents
For each agent introduced in the system, the resources owned are distinguished from the
resources not owned. For each resource, a valuation for the agent who owns it is chosen ran-
domly between 50 and 500. Then, the valuation for the other agent is calculated according to
the “error” the agent is making in evaluating the resources he does not own. We use a Gauss-
ian distribution to encode this error, where the mean (noted error) of the distribution and
standard deviation (noted stdvar) are expressed as percentages of the valuation attributed to
the resource by the system for its owner. Finally—for both agents—the preference bound-
aries (pref min and prefmax) are calculated for each resource according to the percentage
of potential beneﬁt over the reservation price that an agent will try to make when buying or
selling resources (Assumption 2).
5.2 Detailed example
Let us look at an example to illustrate the model as well as our simulation parameters.
In order to clarify the notation, we use [x, y]
j
i as a shorthand for prefmini(rj) = x and
prefmaxi(rj) = y when rj ∈ resi (in that case: x ≤ y) .I nt h es a m ew a y ,w eu s e[y,x]
j
i
as a shorthand for prefmini(rj) = x and prefmaxi(rj) = y when rj / ∈ resi (in which case:
x ≥ y). Let an IBN domain be such that:
– A ={A, B} is the set of agents;
– G ={ G1,...,G17} is the set of all possible goals;
– goalA = G1 and goalB = G8;
– Res = r1,...,r20;
– sub ={ (G1,{G2,G3}),(G1,{G4,G5}),(G1,{G6,G7}),(G1,{G8,G9}),
(G2,{r1,r2}),(G3,{r3,r4}),(G4,{r5,r6}),(G5,{r7,r8}),(G6,{r9,r10}),
(G7,{r11,r12}),(G8,{G9,G10}),(G8,{G11,G12}),(G9,{r13,r14}),
(G10,{r15,r16}),(G11,{r17,r18}),(G12,{r19,r20}),(G13,{r1,r2}),
(G13,{r3,r4}),(G14,{r5,r6}),(G14,{r7,r8}),(G15,{r9,r10}),
(G15,{r11,r12}),(G15,{G2,G3}),(G16,{G4,G5}),(G16,{G6,G7}),
(G16,{G8,G9}),(G17,{r1,r2}),(G17,{r3,r4}),(G17,{r5,r6}),
(G17,{r7,r8}),(G17,{r9,r10});
– resA ={ r1,r7,r8,r9,r10,r11,r12,r14,r15,r16,r17,r18,r19, r20}
– BudgetA = 2000
– resB ={ r2,r3,r4,r5,r6,r13};
– BudgetB = 1500
– ThevaluesofvalA,valB,prefminA,prefminB,prefmaxA andprefmaxB,havebeengen-
erated with errorA = errorB = 0% and stdvarA = stdvarB = 70% and with potential
beneﬁt of 11%:
[353,388]
r1
A,[308,343]
r2
A,[51,57]
r3
A,[411,456]
r4
A,[265,294]
r5
A,[457,508]
r6
A,[86,94]
r7
A,
[268,295]
r8
A,[410,451]
r9
A, [254,278]
r10
A , [103,113]
r11
A , [433,476]
r12
A , [220,244]
r13
A ,
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Fig. 3 Plans initially generated by agents A and B
[371,408]
r14
A , [200,220]
r15
A , [468,515]
r16
A , [114,126]
r17
A , [95,105]
r18
A , [470,517]
r19
A ,
[154,169]
r20
A ,a n d
[147,174]
r1
B,[314,346]
r2
B,[66,73]
r3
B,[445,490]
r4
B,[432,475]
r5
B,[427,470]
r6
B,[80,89]
r7
B,
[222,247]
r8
B, [262,328]
r9
B, [171,214]
r10
B , [72,90]
r11
B , [323,404]
r12
B , [240,264]
r13
B ,
[126,157]
r14
B , [266,295]
r15
B , [524,583]
r16
B , [103,115]
r17
B , [63,70]
r18
B , [400,444]
r19
B ,
[171,190]
r20
B
In this example, we assume that ρ = 1 (see Definition 6). The agents generate all the
possible plans to achieve their main goals along with their costs as shown in Fig. 3. With
those domain values, we will exemplify both the BO and the BR cases.
BO case
According to the proposed bargaining protocol, agents A and B ﬁrst reveal their needs. The
preferred plans according to  c
A and  c
B are P2
A and P2
B respectively (see Fig. 3). This leads
to: missingA ={ r5,r6} and missingB ={ r17,r18,r19,r20}. As shown in the following table,
the agents start the second part of the bargaining protocol with their preferred offers B1
and A1 (Definition 7). Then, following the concession strategy (Definition 8), B repeats his
offer and A cannot change her’s either, indicating that the ending condition (Definition 9)i s
reached and the bargaining process fails.
Nb Message evalA evalB
B1  {r17,r18,r19,r20},{r5,r6},−208 B→A −177 +168
A1  {r5,r6},{r17,r18,r19,r20},−195 A→B +164 −235
B2  {r17,r18,r19,r20},{r5,r6},−208 B→A −177 +168
A2 reject
After this bargaining, the two agents withdraw their selected plans. For agent A, P3
A is the
next preferred plan. Because P3
A has no missing resource, agent A will achieve her goal on
her own. Agent B’s next preferred plan is P1
B which involves missing resources r14, r15 and
r16. The following table summarizes the second bargaining that fails:
Nb Message evalA evalB
B1  {r14,r15,r16},{},+916 B→A −123 +119
A1  {},{r14,r15,r16},−1143 A→B +104 −108
B2  {r14,r15,r16},{},+1029.5 B→A −9.5 +5.5
... ... ... ...
A4  {},{r14,r15,r16},−1043.7 A→B +4.7 −8.7
B5  {r14,r15,r16},{},+1029.5 B→A −9.5 +5.5
A5 reject
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In this case, only agent A succeeds in achieving her goal with a plan P3
A that has a cost of
1200.
BR case
In the BR case, everything is identical to the BO case until the end of the ﬁrst bargaining,
at which point the agents will both try to reframe, leading to the conversation represented in
the following table. First, they ask each other for the reasons behind the requested resources.
After revealing these, they each compute the possible plans (along with their costs) for the
other agent to achieve his/her goal(s) and since they do not have any cheaper alternative to
propose, they iterate and start a new reframing. While A’s third reframing attempt leads to a
rejection (utterances A5 and B6), B proposes a cheaper plan for A’s goal G1 in his second
reframing attempt (utterance B3, A4 and B5,s e eF i g .3 for the costs). Note that B proposes
P1
A rather than P3
A according to  b
B (P3
A does not allow any beneﬁt).
Nb Perf. Message
B1 request why {r5,r6} B→A
A1 request why {r17,r18,r19,r20} A→B
B2 inform because {G11,{r17,r18}},{G12,{r19,r20}} B→A
A2 inform because {G4,{r5,r6}} A→B
B3 request why {G4} B→A
A3 request why {G11,G12} A→B
B4 inform because {G8,{r17,r18,r19,r20}} B→A
A4 inform because {G1,{r5,r6,r7,r8}} A→B
B5 inform cheaper {G1,{r1,r2,r3,r4}} B→A
A5 request why {G8} A→B
B6 reject why {G8} B→A
Agent A will update her valuation function with respect to the new information (Defini-
tion 10), the values of the resources will be changed, resulting in updated plans’ costs. The
evaluatedcostof P1
A for A becomes1191(withtheupdatedpreferenceintervals[265,332]
r2
A,
[37,64]
r3
A, [356,445]
r4
A), and the cost of P2
A becomes 1192. Agent A’s preferred plan is now
P1
A. The following table summarizes the next bargaining, in which a deal is reached.
Nb Message evalA evalB
A1  {r2,r3,r4},{r14,r15,r16},−484 A→B +269 −274
B1  {r14,r15,r16},{r2,r3,r4},+7 B→A −209 +217
A2  {r2,r3,r4},{r14,r15,r16},−245 A→B +30 −35
B2  {r14,r15,r16},{r2,r3,r4},+133 B→A −82 +90
... ... ... ...
A6  {r2,r3,r4},{r14,r15,r16},−217 A→B +2 −7
B6  {r14,r15,r16},{r2,r3,r4},+223 B→A +8 +0
A7 accept
In this example, reframing allows agent B to achieve his goal (which he did not achieve
in the BO case) while agent A achieves her goal for a cost of 1191 (which is cheaper than
in the BO case). The next section presents a more systematic study of the qualitative and
quantitative advantages of IBN.
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6 Simulations and results
The aim of our simulations is to evaluate the eventual beneﬁts of the BR strategy over the
BO one. To this end, we conducted experiments using three different scenarios:
1. The buyer-seller case: Only one agent has a goal to achieve. Consequently, only this
agent can potentially need some resources. He (the buyer) will have to buy these from
the other agent (the seller) and a deal consists of exchanging resources for money.
2. General negotiation with asymmetric reframing: The two agents are pursuing goals and
may want to exchange sets of resources. However, only one of the agents is capable of
initiating a reframing.
3. General negotiation with symmetric reframing: same as above, but with the two agents
being able to initiate a reframing after an unsuccessful bargaining. This is the case
described so far in this paper. BR agents are using the meta-strategy number 6 as deﬁned
in Sect. 4.3.2.
These three settings are of increasing complexity and, as we will see, some properties of
the simpler buyer-seller case no longer hold in more complex settings. The second scenario
allowsustoinvestigatetheimpactofasymmetryonthemodel’sbehavior,whilethethirdone
covers the general case. Before presenting and discussing the results of these experiments,
we ﬁrst detail our experimental settings and describe the various dimensions that we use to
compare BO and BR negotiations.
6.1 Experimental settings
In order to evaluate and characterize the hypothetical beneﬁt(s) of using reframing, we con-
ducted simulations of bilateral negotiation between agents for which errors on the valuation
of resources not owned was varied from −70% to +70% by steps of 5%. The standard devi-
ation of this error was set to zero20 and the potential beneﬁt b was set to 20%. For each
combination of errors, 100 different IBN domains were generated and for each of them,
BO and BR negotiations were conducted. In other words, each ﬁgure showing our results
hereafter has been generated by some 168200 negotiations.21 Each negotiation consists of
a number of instances of the bargaining protocol and in the BR case some instances of the
reframing one as well.
The simulations were conducted using randomly generated IBN domains in which plans
are trees with a branching factor of 2, of depth 3, and the number of alternative decom-
positions is 4 (but only for the root decomposition). This results in 4 different plans being
generated per agent for a total of 32 resources in the system.
6.2 Qualitative and quantitative dimensions when comparing BO and BR
Inordertoassesstheproposedmodel,weneedtodeﬁneametricthatcanbeusedtocompare
negotiation outcomes. When evaluating the beneﬁt of reframing, it is important to differen-
tiate qualitative differences from quantitative ones.
Themainqualitativedimensionoftheoutcomeofaparticularnegotiationiswhetheradeal
isreachedornot.Thisisrelatedtothemainqualitativeinterestoftheagents:thatis,achieving
20 Forthesakeofsimplicity,weassumedthattheerrormadebyagivenagentoveralltheresourcesnotowned
was constant.
21 We have 29 possible errors level for both agents and we run 100 simulations in the two conditions, for a
total of 29 × 29 × 200 = 168200 negotiations.
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theirgoals.Indeed,whilesometimesadealenablesbothagentstoachievetheirgoals,atleast
one agent’s goal will be achieved when a deal is reached (e.g., a buyer-seller case). Note that
deals are sufﬁcient but not always necessary since agents can sometimes achieve their goals
without reaching a deal (e.g., if they have plans without lacking resources, like agent A in
the BO case of the example presented in Sect. 5.2).
With each particular choice of simulation parameters being used to instantiate two nego-
tiations (a BO and a BR one), four different combinations of goal achievement are possible
for each agent:
1. The agent is not able to reach his goal in the BO case, while he does in the BR case. In
this situation, there is a qualitative beneﬁt of using reframing on top of bargaining.
2. The agent reaches his goal in the BO case but not in the BR one. In that case, there is a
qualitative loss associated with the use of reframing.
3. The agent reaches his goal in the BO and the BR cases. In this situation, we will be
interested in comparing the two cases to see if BR provides any quantitative beneﬁts
over BO.
4. The agent does not reach his goal in either the BO or the BR case. While the agent does
not reach his goal, he might act as a seller and quantitative beneﬁt may still be worth
looking for.
In this study, we are interested in testing whether reframing allows agents to achieve their
goals more often (by reaching deals when BO is unsuccessful). This qualitative dimension
can be characterized using a measure of the beneﬁts in terms of the number of simulations
thatfallintocase1minusthenumberofsimulationsthatfallintocase2.Wecallthismeasure
the beneﬁt in goals. We will also present the total number of deals reached in the BO case as
a baseline on which those beneﬁts in goals sit. This information will be useful to calculate
the statistical significance of our results.
Other qualitative dimensions can help to assess the usefulness of reframing. A particular
reframing can lead to (a) a proposal of an alternative and cheaper plan. If this information
is new, that will entail (b) an update of the valuation function of the agent. We will use
the number of occurrences of (a) and (b) to assess the impact of reframing on the agents’
preferences (through the manipulation of their valuation functions).
In cases where both the BO case and the BR case lead to the same outcome in terms of
a particular agent’s goal achievement (cases 3 and 4 above), quantitative dimensions can be
used to compare BO and BR strategies. In particular, when an agent achieves its goal in both
the BO and BR case (case 3 above), the costs of the plans used to achieve the agents’ goals
may be different. We denote as beneﬁt on plan’s cost the difference between the costs of
these plans.
Deﬁnition 11 (Beneﬁt on plan’s cost) When plans P1
i and P2
i allow agent i to achieve his
goal in the BO and BR cases respectively, the beneﬁt on plan’s cost is deﬁned as: planbene
fi = costi(P2
i ) − costi(P1
i )
Another interesting quantitative dimension is the subjective beneﬁt gained by an agent
duringthenegotiation.Often,adealismadebeforetheagentsreachtheirleastpreferredoffer.
The offer evaluation function (Definition 5) deﬁnes the difference in valuation between the
current offer and their least preferred one. In case of acceptance of the offer, this function
returns the subjective beneﬁt of the agent. When at least one strategy allows a deal to be
reached, the difference between those subjective beneﬁts can be calculated. Note that the
no-deal situation entails an evaluation of zero (evali(Ø) = 0).
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(a) (b)
Fig. 4 Qualitative results for agent A in buyer-seller scenarios. From left to right, we have: a the number
of deals reached in the BO case and b the beneﬁt in goals in case BR is used. Notice that the abscissa and
ordinate graduations of the graph a have been inverted for better readability when compared to b or the other
ﬁgures
Deﬁnition 12 (Subjective beneﬁt in deals)G i v e npBO and pBR, the two outcomes in a BO
and BR case respectively (accepted offers or the no-deal Ø), the subjective beneﬁt in deals
for agent i is deﬁned as: dealbenefi = evali(pBR) − evali(pBO)
6.3 The buyer-seller scenario
Theﬁrstexperimentconsidersbuyer-sellerscenarios.Agent A ispursuingagoalandislikely
to need some of agent B’s resources in order to achieve it. Agent A will thus act as a buyer.
Agent B does not have a domain-related goal to accomplish, and will thus never ask for
resources. Agent B is however interested in selling resources as long as she makes some
proﬁt (i.e., subjective beneﬁt in deals, Definition 12). In those scenarios, only agent B can
initiate a reframing that can, if successful, lead agent A to update her valuation function.
Figure 4a shows the results of this experiment in terms of the qualitative dimensions
deﬁned in Sect. 6.2. When agent A over-evaluates B’s resources, a deal will always be
reached (left half of the Fig. 4a). Note that deals are reached 100% of the time and the noise
that can be observed corresponds to the fact that sometimes agent A owns all the resources
of her preferred plan so that no negotiation is needed (and no deal is reached).
Whenever A over-evaluates B’s resources, there will be no difference between the BO
and the BR cases since agent A always makes an over-evaluated initial proposal that agent
B accepts directly.22 The ﬁrst bargaining will always succeed, and reframing will never take
place (right half of Fig. 4b).
Conversely, when agent A under-evaluates B’s resources (right half of Fig. 4a), no deal is
reached in the BO case while significant beneﬁts in goals can be made using the BR strategy
(left half of Fig. 4b). In those cases, agent A only achieves her goal when she has a plan for
which she owns all the resources.
For the quantitative results, in cases where both BO and BR allow A to achieve her
goal, there are substantial beneﬁts on the plan’s cost (Fig. 5c) and subjective beneﬁt on deals
(Fig.5d)whenreframingisused.Thosebeneﬁtsvaryaccordingtoagent B’serrorsabout A’s
resources’ valuations. These errors shape agent B’s cost preference relation over A’s plans.
The beneﬁts for A are greater when agent B underestimates agent A’s resources. Fig. 6a
22 Note that, in the buyer-seller scenario, the buyer (i.e., agent A) is always the initiator of the bargaining
because she is the only agent requesting resources.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 5 Quantitative results for agent A in buyer-seller scenarios, when both BO and BR allow achieving the
goal: a the mean of the beneﬁt on the cost of the plan (Definition 11)a n db the mean difference in subjective
beneﬁts from deals (Definition 12)
(a) (b)
Fig. 6 Buyer-seller scenario—results for agent A (which acts as the buyer): a number of valuation updates,
b number of times only BO allows A to achieve her goal
explains this phenomenon by showing that more successful reframing (i.e., more valuation
function updates) occurs in that case. This explanation can be reﬁned by having a closer look
at the negotiation logs.
When agent A underestimates B’s resources, she tends to prefer plans which include
more missing resources, as these are undervalued. Symmetrically, when B overestimates A’s
resources, he will also tend to prefer the plans involving more of his own resources. In that
case, B will have fewer alternatives to propose to A during the reframing since they tend to
agree on the preferable plans (according to their cost preference relations). Consequently,
the reframing has less impact on A’s valuation update, as shown by Fig. 6a.
Conversely, when B underestimates A’s resources, the plans involving more of A’s
resources will start being evaluated as the most preferable ones. In those cases, the agents’
preferred plans diverge and the reframing has more impact on the negotiation as shown by
the rising number of valuation updates in Fig. 6a.
Furthermore, Fig. 6b shows that there is no case in which BO does better than BR. How-
ever, there are clearly cases in which BR does better than BO, as shown in Fig. 4b. As far
as B is concerned, BR also allows him to improve his beneﬁt, as shown in Fig. 7.T h e s e
experimental evidences allow us to conclude that in those buyer-seller scenarios, BR Pareto-
dominates BO. That is, there is no case in which BO gives a better result than BR, while BR
sometimes improves the result of BO. Even if our experimental results give more precise
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Fig. 7 Buyer-seller
scenario—results for agent B
(which acts as the seller):
difference in beneﬁt made using
the BR and the BO strategy
(a) (b)
Fig. 8 General case with asymmetric reframing—qualitative results. From left to right,w eh a v e :a the num-
ber of deals reached using BO and b the number of goals achieved with BR and not with BO for agent A.
Notice that the abscissa and ordinate graduations of the graph of a have been inverted when compared to b or
the other ﬁgures for better readability
indications about the beneﬁt obtained, in this particularly restricted case, this result could
have been analytically reached, as noticed in previous work on IBN [38].
Unfortunately, this result will no longer hold in more complex settings. That is what
justiﬁes the use of empirical simulation to study the model.
6.4 General case with asymmetric reframing
Our second experiment looks at the case in which both agents have a goal to accomplish, but
only agent B is allowed to initiate a reframing. This means that agent A is the only one who
can update her evaluation function (only agent B can propose cheaper alternatives). While
this case is more complex than the previous one, it simpliﬁes the model by ensuring that
agent B’spreferencerelations, c
B and b
B,overbothhisownplansandagent A’splans,will
not change. This setting also gives an opportunity to study the consequence of asymmetry in
the model.
Figure 8a shows the number of deals reached in the BO case while Fig. 8b and Fig. 10a
show the qualitative beneﬁts of using reframing for agents A and B respectively. Note that,
when both agents overestimate the other’s resources, both agents tend to give too much for
the resources and a deal is always reached during the ﬁrst bargaining. In that case—as in
the similar case in the buyer seller scenarios—the agents will never have a chance to use
reframing and there is no qualitative or quantitative difference between BO and BR.
In the asymmetric scenarios, the consequences of reframing are asymmetric as well, as
illustrated by Fig. 8b, Figs, 9 and 10. When B underestimates A’s resources, the reframing is
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(a) (b)
Fig.9 General casewith asymmetric reframing—quantitativeresultsforagent A.Fromleftto rightwehave:
a the mean of agent A’s beneﬁt on the cost of the plan used and b the mean of the difference in subjective
beneﬁt made during the deal
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 10 Comparing BO and BR for agent B. From left to right we have: a the number of goals achieved with
BR and not with BO, and when both BO and BR achieved the goal, b the mean of the beneﬁt on the cost of
the plan used and c the mean of the difference in subjective deal beneﬁt
in most cases beneﬁcial to both agents. However, when agent B overestimates A’s resources
less than A underestimates B’s resources (see the triangular shape, projected on the x × y
plane, in Fig. 10a), advising agent A through the reframing strategy can lead to negative
results for B. This can be explained as follows.
When agent A updates her valuation function valA after a successful reframing, she takes
all her plans into consideration again. In this asymmetric scenario, agent B will by assump-
tion never update his valuation function (since A is not conducting any reframing) causing
the preferred plan to be dropped after any unsuccessful bargaining. Agent B can thus easily
runoutofplans,whileagent A stillhasplanstotry.Thisisabadside-effectofourbargaining
agentbehavioralmodelaspresentedinSect.4.3.1.TheBOstrategyhasbeendesignedhaving
in mind a symmetric case and would have to be adapted in order to cope with asymmetric
scenarios like those considered here. For example, the agent can stick with his least preferred
plan rather than discarding it as is the case with the current strategy. When the agent has no
more plans to consider, he becomes a seller for the end of the negotiation, thus renouncing
his goal. These negative results, as well as some that are not generated by such asymmetry,
are further discussed and exempliﬁed in Sect. 7.1.
Overall, it is no surprise that agent A beneﬁts from these asymmetric scenarios more than
B since A is the only one to receive information about alternatives evaluated as cheaper by
B. The next section describes our last experiment.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 11 The general case—qualitative results. From left to right we have: a deals reached in the BO case and
b beneﬁtin term of number ofgoals achieved in theBRcase. Notice thattheabscissa and ordinategraduations
of the graph of a have been inverted when compared to b or the other ﬁgures for better readability
6.5 The general, symmetric case
The general case corresponds to the model described in the rest of this paper. Both agents
have a goal to achieve and both can initiate reframing. Meta-strategy number 6 (as presented
in Sect. 4.3.2) is used to sequence bargainings and reframings.
6.5.1 Frequency and quality of the deals
The results for the qualitative dimension are summed up by Fig. 11b, which presents the
beneﬁt in terms of the difference in the number of goals achieved between BR and BO
negotiations. This shows the interest of reframing as a strategy that allows agents to reach
deals more often than with bargaining only. Here again, and for the reasons detailed in previ-
ous sections, this difference—that is, the qualitative advantage—disappears when the agents
overestimate the resources. It also suggests that the advantage of reframing can be made big-
gerbyusingmeta-strategiesotherthanthecurrentone(number6inthelistofSect.4.3.2).For
example, a strategy that would allow reframing before the ﬁrst bargaining may improve the
overall results. However, these other meta-strategies introduce unfairness in certain cases as
explained in Sect. 4.3.2. Exploring the various other meta-strategies discussed in Sect. 4.3.2
is left as future work.
Another qualitative dimension is whether a particular reframing is successful (an alter-
native plan is proposed) and whether it is taken into account by the agent (the information
is actually new to the agent: i.e., the reframing is followed by an update of the valuation
function of the agent). Fig. 13a shows the mean over the number of updates of the agents’
valuation functions per negotiation.
Quantitative dimensions of the quality of deals can also be used to compare BO and BR
strategies:
– Subjective beneﬁt made by the agents: Fig. 12d presents the mean of the difference
between the subjective beneﬁt made by the agents in deals reached by the BO vs. BR
agents;
– Beneﬁt in terms of the cost of the plan(s) enabled by the deal made: Fig. 12c presents the
mean of the difference in cost of the plans.
These aspects are correlated with the second qualitative dimension, i.e., successful refra-
ming has a positive effect on the quality of the deal. In conclusion, not only are more deals
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(a) (b)
Fig. 12 The general case—quantitative results (sum for both agents). When both agents achieve their goals
we have: a beneﬁt on the cost of the plan used, b difference in beneﬁt of the agents between the two conditions
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 13 a Mean of the number of valuation updates per negotiation, b mean over the number of messages per
negotiation in the BO case and c mean over the number of messages exchanged in the BR case
reached in the BR case but also the deals reached are of better quality for the agents. Notice
that we present both agents’ results together and the ﬁgures are more or less symmetrical,
which indicates that the proposed negotiation process is not biased in favor of one of the
parties.
6.5.2 Negotiation complexity
In order to measure the overhead of using reframing, we assumed that the size of messages
is bounded by a constant and we measured the number of messages used in BO negotiations
(Fig. 13b) and in BR negotiations (Fig. 13c). These numbers are correlated with the number
of bargainings23 made in the ﬁrst case (bounded to four with the domain values used for the
simulations) and the number of bargainings and reframings made in the second one (Fig. 13a
gives a lower bound for both in the BR cases).
The cost of reframing in terms of communication is clear. However, the bottleneck of the
system is the number of alternative plans as calculated by Algorithm 1 presented in Sect. 3
whichisexponentialinthenumberofalternativespergoal.Thisismultiplyingthenumberof
possiblenegotiationsandaffectsboththeBOandBRnegotiationsystems.Thisresultregard-
ing the complexity of the search space is quite common and usual solutions and heuristics to
circumvent it would apply [51].
23 This denotes the number of times the bargaining protocol is used and should not be confused with the
number of bargaining rounds within an instance of the bargaining protocol.
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6.6 Synthesis of the results
Table 1 synthesizes and summarizes our results. For each of the three scenarios considered
in our study (buyer seller, asymmetric and symmetric), the results for a given type of error
made on the estimations by each agent are presented. Each result corresponds to the average
of the difference between the BO and BR conditions in each experiment, and the standard
deviation is indicated in parenthesis. More precisely, the table presents our results using the
following columns:
– Case: This column numbers the lines for ease of reference.
– Situation:Foreachline,thiscolumnindicateswhichofthethreesituationsisconsidered.
The three possibilities are: (a) the buyer-seller scenario (only A may need B’s resources,
i.e., A is the buyer, B the seller), (b) the general case with asymmetric reframing (only
B can initiate a reframing, only B can thus recommend cheaper alternatives and only A
can update her valuation function) and (c) the general symmetrical case.
– Error A: For each line, this column indicates what type of errors agent A is doing in her
original evaluation of the resources she does not own. The following types of errors can
be considered:
1. Underestimate: This encompasses all the cases in which the agent somehow under-
estimates the value of the resources not owned: that is, when the error is between 0
and −70% of the valuation maintained by the owner.
2. Overestimate: This encompasses all the cases in which the agent overestimates the
value of the resources not owned: that is, when the error lies between 0 and +70%
of the valuation maintained by the owner.
3. Both(noted–):Thisencompassesallthecases,regardlessoftheerrormade(between
−70 and +70%).
– Error B: idem for agent B.
– Agent: For each line, this column indicates which agent is considered.
– bgoals: This column indicates the average beneﬁt in goals for the agent considered (stan-
dard deviation is indicated in parenthesis). These qualitative results can be read as a
percentage indicating how often BR allows the agent to reach his goal where BO did not.
– bcost: This column indicates the average beneﬁt in terms of the plan cost for the agent
consideredasintroducedinDefinition11(standarddeviationisindicatedinparenthesis).
This quantitative advantage can occur only when both BR and BO were successful.
– bdeals: This column indicates the average beneﬁt in terms of the resources exchanged
as deﬁned in Definition 12 for the agent considered (standard deviation is indicated in
parenthesis).Thisquantitativeadvantageiscomputedasthedifferenceinallnegotiations
(0 is used when no deal is reached).
– p-value: This column presents an upper boundary on the p-value resulting from the sta-
tistical significance test as described below.
While 27 cases, or lines,24 could have been shown, only 19 relevant ones have been listed
to avoid redundant information.
The table also indicates the statistical significance of the results presented in this paper
and by doing so backs up all the general claims made, while presenting our detailed analysis
of these results in previous sections. Since for each experiment, the BO and BR conditions
have been conducted under the very same settings, domain parameters and with the same
24 Three situations, three types of errors for both agents, that is: 3 × 3 × 3 = 27 settings.
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agents,single-tailed(orone-sided)25 pairedt-testshavebeenconducted.Thet-testcompares
two means (given their standard deviation) and tests a null hypothesis stating that they do
not differ. The p-value indicates the probability of obtaining results at least as extreme as
the ones that were actually observed, assuming that the null hypothesis is true. The lower
the p-value, the higher the chances are that the claim that one condition (BR in our case)
is a significant improvement over the other (BO in our case) is true. In our case, all the
results presented are highly statistically significant (because they have very low p-values,
0.01 being the standard in inferential statistics). This is a direct consequence of the number
of experiments conducted. Indeed, each result is an average of either:
1. 42050 negotiations, that is 21025 comparisons between BO and BR conditions. Note
thatthiscorrespondstoanaverageoveronequadrantintheFigurepresentingtheresults.
2. 84100 negotiations, that is 42050 comparisons between BO and BR conditions. Note
that this corresponds to an average over half a Figure presenting the results.
3. 168200 negotiations, that is 84100 comparisons between BO and BR conditions. This
corresponds to an average over a whole Figure.
These large numbers allow us to draw conclusion without ambiguity.
Lines1to8ofTable1generaliseandsynthesiseresultsforthebuyersellercase,presented
in Figs. 4, 5 and 7 and can be read as follows:
1. Lines 1 and 2: when agent A overestimates the value of the resources not owned, there is
neither qualitative nor quantitative difference between BO and BR for agent A.T h e r ei s
nodifferenceinbeneﬁtsbetweenBOandBRforagent B (bgoalsandbcostareirrelevant
in that case since B is the seller).
2. Lines3and4:whenbothagentsunderestimatethevalueoftheresourcesnotowned,there
aresignificantqualitativeandquantitativeadvantagesfor A andasignificantquantitative
advantage for B in terms of beneﬁts made when a deal is reached.
3. Lines 5 and 6: when agent A underestimates the value of the resources not owned, there
aresignificantqualitativeandquantitativeadvantagesfor A andasignificantquantitative
advantage for B in terms of beneﬁts made when a deal is reached.
4. Lines 7 and 8: overall (that is, independently of the errors made by the agents knowing
that these would be comprised between −70% and +70%), there are significant qualita-
tive and quantitative advantages for A and a significant quantitative advantage for B in
terms of beneﬁts made when a deal is reached.
Lines 9 to 15 generalise and synthesise results for the general asymmetric case, presented
in Figs. 8, 9,a n d10 and can be read as follows:
1. Lines 9 and 10: when both agents overestimate the value of the resources not owned,
there is neither qualitative nor quantitative difference between BO and BR for either
agent.
2. Lines 11 and 12: when B underestimate the value of the resources not owned, there are
significant qualitative or quantitative advantages for both agents. The asymmetric refra-
ming possibility favors A for the qualitative and plan cost dimension (and the difference
is significant).
3. Lines 13 and 14: when agent A underestimates the value of the resources not owned and
B overestimates these, there are significant qualitative and quantitative disadvantages
for agent B. This negative result is further analyzed and explained in Sects. 6.4 and 7.1.
25 A two-tailed test is used when one just wants to conclude that there is a difference, while a one-sided test
draw conclusion about the sign of that difference.
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4. Lines 14 and 15: overall (that is, independent of the errors made by the agents knowing
that these are comprised between −70% and +70%), there are significant qualitative
and quantitative advantages for both agents. The qualitative and plan cost advantage is
clearly less important for B.
Lines 16 to 19 generalise and synthesise results for the general case, presented in Figs. 11
and 12 and can be read as follows:
1. Line 16: when both agents overestimate the value of the resources not owned, there is
neither qualitative nor quantitative difference between BO and BR for either agent.
2. Lines17and18:whenatleastoneoftheagentsunderestimatesthevalueoftheresources
not owned, there are significant qualitative or quantitative advantages for both agents.
3. Line 19: overall (that is, independent of the errors made by the agents knowing that
these are comprised between −70% and +70%), there are significant qualitative and
quantitative advantages to use BR for both agents.
While many other claims can be made from our experimental results, these are the main
ones we wanted to emphasize to clarify our contribution.
One last but important remark is that while the quantitative results are somehow tied to
the specifics of the proposed bargaining protocol and strategies, the qualitative results are
not. Indeed, these results emphasize the fact that reframing allow deals to be reached in the
BR cases where no deal is possible in the BO cases. These qualitative results hold indepen-
dently of the bargaining protocol and strategies used. Indeed, when no deal is possible, this
is because the bargaining interval—i.e., the intersection of the preference intervals of the
agents—is empty and no bargaining protocol will reach a deal in that case. Our bargaining
protocol and strategy guarantee that a deal will be found whenever the bargaining interval is
not empty. This property should hold for any reasonable bargaining procedure. The empha-
sis of the paper is thus not on ﬁnding the best bargaining protocol or strategy but rather on
making a point about the beneﬁt of reframing in general.
7 Discussion
7.1 Negative results
The shapes of the ﬁgures presenting our experimental results highlight the non-linearity and
the complexity of the proposed model. This shows the inherent complexity of interactions
between agents with partial, imperfect, imprecise or erroneous knowledge. While the BR
case Pareto-dominates the BO case in the buyer-seller scenario (as shown in Sect. 6.3), this
is not the case in the other, more general, cases. In fact, there are a few cases in which the
ﬁgures indicate negative results, i.e. combinations for which BO outperforms BR.
Indeed, there are cases in which BO agents succeed in reaching their goals while BR
agents fail (for the same set of domain data). For example, suppose both the agents have
three plans available for reaching their goal and the preference ordering for their own plans
is deﬁned as follows: P1
A  c
A P2
A  c
A P3
A for A and P1
B  c
B P2
B  c
B P3
B for B.I nt h eB O
case, the following series of bargainings will occur where we assume that the third one is a
success:
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A’s selected plan B’s selected plan Bargaining
P1
A P1
B failure
P2
A P2
B failure
P3
A P3
B success
In the BR case, the ﬁrst bargaining of this sequence will still fail (like in the BO case).
The agents will then try to reframe. Suppose the cost preference ordering of agent B over
the plans for agent A is: P3
A  c
B P1
A  c
B P2
A. In this case, agent B will suggest that plan P3
A
is actually cheaper than plan P1
A. Agent A will update her valuation function and take all the
plans into account again while agent B will not reconsider plan P1
B. The rest of the sequence
of bargainings will then be:
A’s selected plan B’s selected plan Bargaining
P3
A P2
B failure
P1
A P3
B failure
P2
A ∅ failure
A successful reframing will generally change the combination of bargainings that occur.
This can lead to a situation in which no bargaining will succeed, resulting in a failure of the
agents’ goals.
Note that these cases (as well as related ones) are rare and that this effect is counter-bal-
anced by the fact that the successful reframing itself increases the likelihood of reaching an
agreement. These cases are also linked to the chosen meta-strategy as discussed in previous
sections. Meta-strategies that would preclude reframing to perform worse or sub-optimal in
some cases by revisiting plans in a more systematic fashion may have other consequences,
e.g., higher communication overhead, longer negotiations or even inﬁnite loops. Inquiring
solution to ﬁx this problem is left as future work.
7.2 Loops
There are also cases in which the proposed (recursive) reframing method loops. Of course,
as such loops can be detected, the agents have been programmed to stop trying to reframe
and go back to a BO strategy in such cases.
Supposethatthepreferenceorderingforagent A is: P1
A  c
A P2
A  c
A P3
A andthepreference
orderingagent B hasovertheplansof A are:(1)costpreferenceordering: P2
A  c
B P3
A  c
B P1
A
and (2) proﬁt preference ordering: P3
A  b
B P2
A  b
B P1
A. We assume that agent A has no sug-
gestions for agent B and that all the bargainings fail. In the following table, we can see the
sequence of agent A’s cost preference relation resulting from the iteration of the updating of
the valuations of the resources’ values according to B’s recommendations.
Preferences of agent A (subjective costs)
P1
A(400)  c P2
A(500)  c P3
A(550)
P3
A(475)  c P1
A(476)  c P2
A(500)
P1
A(476)  c P2
A(487.5)  c P3
A(488.5)
P3
A(481)  c P1
A(483)  c P2
A(487.5)
…
123Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst
Thecostsareconvergingandthenstartloopingastheplansgetreorderedinacircularway.
Several extensions of the model are possible to handle these (rare) cases in a more elegant
way, for example by enabling agents to memorize and reason about the coherence of the
other agent’s recommendations. Different update functions will also have various impacts
on this phenomenon.
Thesetwophenomenaareadirectconsequenceofmakingtheagents’preferencesdynamic
in the context of uncertain and possibly erroneous valuation knowledge. Moving away from
thespecificsofthepreviousdiscussionsnextsectionsummarizesandgeneralizesourresults.
7.3 Stability
Stability refers to the fact that agent should not have an incentive to deviate from the agreed-
upon strategies proposed by the given negotiation framework [58]. We do not want agent
designers (e.g., companies) to have an incentive to build their agents with different, manip-
ulative, strategies.
In analytical frameworks, like game-theoretic ones, simpliﬁcation are made, usually
though assumptions of complete and perfect knowledge, so that the optimal behavior can
be computed (eventually off-line). When that is the case, the optimal behavior is publicly
revealed and there is nothing better to do than just carrying it out. In case of incomplete
information, it is sometimes possible to design mechanisms in the sense that it is always
individually rational for each rational to behave non strategically (in particular truthfully).
Such mechanisms are said to be incentive compatible.
On one hand, given our assumptions and the realism of our model—including the pres-
ence of erroneous information—we did not succeed in showing stability of our approach.
As in any other automated negotiation framework, there is indeed a number of manipula-
tions that are possible during the bargaining (e.g., decoy bargaining, premature bargaining
failure, premature bargaining acceptance, delayed bargaining acceptance) or the reframing
(e.g., hidden goal, phantom goal, wrong alternative, false information, cheap talk) [47].
On the other hand, we did not ﬁnd any case in which an agent has a clear, locally comput-
able, incentive to deviate from the prescribed strategies using some of the above mentioned
manipulations. The same complexity that precludes us to prove properties of stability pre-
cludes the agents to develop rational deviation strategies.
Furtherinquiringtheclassicalgametheoreticpropertiesofnegotiationframeworks—indi-
vidual rationality, symmetry, efﬁciency and stability—is left as future work.
8 Conclusion and future work
The traditional form of automated negotiation, characterized by position-based approaches,
is restricted to bargaining. This consists of an exchange of offers by the agents trying to
accommodate each other’s preferences until a deal is acceptable to both parties or the negoti-
ation terminates unsuccessfully. These approaches tend to view the object of the negotiation
and the agents’ preferences as being ﬁxed. By focusing on interests to be satisﬁed rather
than positions to be won, reframing—a particular IBN strategy—allows the agents to search
the space of negotiation objects (rather than the space of deals for a particular exchange of
items).
Previous works have claimed that IBN improves the likelihood and the quality of agree-
ments. Our main aim was to test that hypothesis in the context of a formal, computational
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model. Despite a number of assumptions made explicit throughout the text, the presented
model is very general and captures both the usual buyer-seller negotiations as well as more
general cases of exchange of sets of resources with monetary compensation. The notion of
consumable resources has been left unspeciﬁed to further enhance this generality and the
applicability of the approach.
In conclusion, the results presented in this paper show that reframing significantly im-
proves the quantity of successful negotiations (i.e., negotiations that allow the agents to
achieve their goals). Furthermore, when the negotiation restricted to bargaining is already
successful, then the use of the reframing strategy tends to reduce the cost of the plans and
improves the beneﬁt made during the deal. It is however crucial to notice that these qualita-
tive and quantitative advantages are not regular results of an analytical nature, but statistical
results that hold in general rather than in every case.
Inhissurveyofmodelsforautomatednegotiation,Buttner[4]notesthatamongthe74arti-
cles reviewed; only 7 take advantage of argumentation-based approaches, only 12 consider
some sort of incomplete information about the negotiated item(s), and none does both. More
generally, the model of automated negotiation proposed in this paper partially addresses the
four limitations attached to position-based approaches and mentioned in Sect. 2.1.3. Indeed,
in the proposed model:
1. The agents do not have any a priori knowledge (not even stochastic) of the other’s utility
function or goal(s) (no restriction to complete, common information).
2. The agents have imperfect (i.e., erroneous) information on the value of the resources not
owned. The error made by the agents on the evaluation of the resources not owned has
been varied to explore this dimension (no restriction to perfect information).
3. The reframing strategy takes advantage of the communication and cognitive capabilities
of goal-driven artiﬁcial agents (no restriction to an exchange of offers).
4. Thereframingstrategyentailsthattheagents’preferencesareupdateddynamically.Both
the cost and the beneﬁt preference relations may be affected by reframing dialogues (no
restriction to static preferences).
The expressivity and realism gained, when added to the robustness to incomplete and
erroneous information about the object of the negotiation and the opponent, gives a promis-
ing ground for building real-world applications in the context of electronic commerce. This
model can be seen as a ﬁrst step towards ﬁlling the gap between formal and computational
approaches for IBN (and ABN) [3].
In giving a ﬁrst empirical evaluation of reframing, this work builds foundations for future
work. More experiments will be done to extend the current results by comparing differ-
ent strategies for updating the agents evaluation of the resources they do not own as well as
differentwaystocombinereframingandbargaining.Experimentswilllookatdifferenttypes
of domain structure as well. Other bargaining and reframing protocols will be developed
allowing agents to exchange information about know-how in order to relax assumptions 6
and 5 respectively.
The model will also be extended to encompass positive and negative interactions between
goals, thus allowing the representation of more domains and cases. Such a study has already
been started in a simpliﬁed variant (i.e., one that can be analytically addressed) of that
model [42]. To progress toward real-world applications of these exiting results, further stud-
ies, experiments and validations are also under investigation in the ﬁeld of human-computer
negotiation (see [13] for preliminary results).
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